Complexity and Effective Prediction
Let G = (I,J,g) be a two-person zero-sum game. We examine the two-person zero-sum repeated game G(k,m) in which player 1 and 2 place down finite state automata with k,m states respectively and the payoff is the average per stage payoff when the two automata face off. We are interested in the cases in which player 1 is "smart" in the sense that k is large but player 2 is "much smarter" in the sense that m>>k. Let S(g) be the value of G were the second player is clairvoyant, i.e., would know the player 1's move in advance. The threshold for clairvoyance is shown to occur for m near min(|I|, |J|)^k. For m of roughly that size, in the exponential scale, the value is close to S(g). For m significantly smaller (for some stage payoffs g) the value does not approach S(g).
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- Abraham Neyman, 2008.
"Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp476, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001945, David K. Levine.
- Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002427, David K. Levine.
- Ben-Porath Elchanan, 1993. "Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, February.
- Ben-Porath, E., 1991. "Repeated games with Finite Automata," Papers 7-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2000. "Two-person repeated games with finite automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(3), pages 309-325. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)