Dissolving a Common Value Partnership in a Repeated 'queto' Game
We analyse a common value, alternating ascending bid, first price auction as a repeated game of incomplete information where the bidders hold equal property rights to the object auctioned off. Consequently they can accept (by quitting) or veto any proposed settlement. We characterise the essentially unique, sequentially rational dynamic Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game under incomplete information on one side and discuss its properties.
|Date of creation:||May 2003|
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- Mertens,Jean-FranÃ§ois & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015.
Cambridge University Press, number 9781107662636.
- Mertens,Jean-FranÃ§ois & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015. "Repeated Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107030206, September.
- Mertens, J.-F., 1986. "Repeated games," CORE Discussion Papers 1986024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kittsteiner, Thomas, 2003. "Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 54-76, July.
- Kittsteiner, Thomas, 2000. "Partnerships and Double Auctions with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-15, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/6017 is not listed on IDEAS
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "Quitting Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(2), pages 265-285, May.
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1998. "Quitting Games," Discussion Papers 1227, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan, 2001. "Quitting Games," Post-Print hal-00465043, HAL.
- Geanakoplos, John, 1994. "Common knowledge," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 40, pages 1437-1496 Elsevier.
- Zvika Neeman, 1999. "Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 679-691.
- Benny Moldovanu, 2002. "How to Dissolve a Partnership," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(1), pages 1-66, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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