Protection of basic research and R&D incentives in an international setting
We look at cumulative innovations and the protection of basic research which does not carry stand-alone commercial values in an international setting. Due to the complementarity of the innovations, we ・d that for some parameter range, technology leading countries do not always prefer the strongest protection standard. On the other hand, technology lagging countries do not always prefer the weakest protection standard. Intellectual property rights may be an instrument to soften R&D competition in the development stage and may be used to coordinate R&D efforts. Our model suggests that there may be less disputes on intellectual property right standards among countries in industries characterised by sequential innovations.
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