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Rewards and Copyrights with Hidden Information

  • Sandén, Klas

    ()

    (Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO))

Registered author(s):

    This paper makes a theoretical contribution by investigating how the optimal copyright legislation depend on hidden information. A mixed hidden action – hidden information model is used. The regulator neither observes the type of firm nor the quality choice of firms. The paper provides no evidence that hidden information can motivate a copyright legislation. In fact it shows that the optimal policy, with asymmetric information, is a reward system that is second best.

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    File URL: http://www.vxu.se/ehv/filer/forskning/cafo/wps/Nek_wp4_09.pdf
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    Paper provided by Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University in its series CAFO Working Papers with number 2009:4.

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    Length: 25 pages
    Date of creation: 26 Sep 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:vxcafo:2009_004
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University, SE 351 95 Växjö, Sweden
    Phone: +46 470 70 87 64
    Web page: http://lnu.se/research-groups/cafo?l=en

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    1. Johnson, William R, 1985. "The Economics of Copying," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(1), pages 158-74, February.
    2. Shavell, S. & van Ypersele de Strihou, T.P.M.C., 1999. "Rewards versus intellectual property rights," Discussion Paper 1999-26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Banerjee, Dyuti S., 2003. "Software piracy: a strategic analysis and policy instruments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 97-127, January.
    4. Novos, Ian E & Waldman, Michael, 1984. "The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(2), pages 236-46, April.
    5. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
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