Rewards and Copyrights with Hidden Information
This paper makes a theoretical contribution by investigating how the optimal copyright legislation depend on hidden information. A mixed hidden action – hidden information model is used. The regulator neither observes the type of firm nor the quality choice of firms. The paper provides no evidence that hidden information can motivate a copyright legislation. In fact it shows that the optimal policy, with asymmetric information, is a reward system that is second best.
|Date of creation:||26 Sep 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University, SE 351 95 Växjö, Sweden|
Phone: +46 470 70 87 64
Web page: http://lnu.se/research-groups/cafo?l=en
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, 1999.
"Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights,"
NBER Working Papers
6956, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Shavell, S. & van Ypersele de Strihou, T.P.M.C., 1999. "Rewards versus intellectual property rights," Discussion Paper 1999-26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- SHAVELL, Steven & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy, . "Rewards versus intellectual property rights," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1597, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Banerjee, Dyuti S., 2003. "Software piracy: a strategic analysis and policy instruments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 97-127, January.
- Johnson, William R, 1985. "The Economics of Copying," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(1), pages 158-74, February.
- Novos, Ian E & Waldman, Michael, 1984. "The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(2), pages 236-46, April.
- Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
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