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Clearing vs. Leakage: Does Note Monopoly Increase Money and Credit Cycles?

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The effects of note monopolisation on the amplitude of money and credit cycles are studied. Note monopolisation trades clearing for leakage. If the central bank's reserve ratio is larger than that of the commercial banks, and if the currency-deposit ratio is sufficiently large, the leakage effect could domi-nate the loss-of-clearing effect (base expansion), such that the credit capacity of the banking system decreases. This was the case when the Bank of Sweden gained a note monopoly in 1904. Money and credit cycles should therefore have become smaller. Swedish bank data for 1871–1938 reveal that money cycles became smaller, but credit cycles larger. The latter is attributed to an increasing time-demand deposit ratio, which increases the credit capacity of the banking system.

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  • Hortlund, Per, 2005. "Clearing vs. Leakage: Does Note Monopoly Increase Money and Credit Cycles?," Ratio Working Papers 67, The Ratio Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0067
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Clearing mechanism; Credit expansion; Currency-deposit ratio; Fiduciary money; Free banking; Leakage; Money multiplier;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers

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