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Mixed contracts for the newsvendor problem with real options

Author

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  • Jörnsten, Kurt

    () (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)

  • Nonås, Sigrid Lise

    () (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)

  • Sandal, Leif K.

    () (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)

  • Ubøe, Jan

    () (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)

Abstract

In this paper we consider the newsvendor model with real options. We consider a mixed contract where the retailer can order a combination of q units subject to the conditions in a classical newsvendor contract and Q real options on the same items. We provide a closed form solution to this mixed contract when the demand is discrete and study some of its properties. We also offer an explicit solution for the continuous case. In particular we demonstrate that a mixed contract may be superior to a real option contract when a manufacturer has a bound on how much variance she is willing to accept.

Suggested Citation

  • Jörnsten, Kurt & Nonås, Sigrid Lise & Sandal, Leif K. & Ubøe, Jan, 2011. "Mixed contracts for the newsvendor problem with real options," Discussion Papers 2011/6, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2011_006
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/164136
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    Keywords

    Newsvendor model; real options; discrete demand; mixed contract;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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