Mixed contracts for the newsvendor problem with real options
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References listed on IDEAS
- von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2004.
"Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: the winner's curse,"
Finance Research Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 11-23, March.
- Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1998. "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts : The Winner's Curse," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9809, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
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KeywordsNewsvendor model; real options; discrete demand; mixed contract;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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