Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening
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- Diderik Lund & Tore Nilssen, 2004. "Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 29(1), pages 23-41, June.
- Diderik Lund & Tore Nilssen, 2004. "Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 29(1), pages 23-41, June.
- Lund,D. & Nilssen,T., 2000. "Cream skimming, dregs skimming, and pooling : on the dynamics of competitive screening," Memorandum 39/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jobst, Andreas A., 2002. "The Pricing puzzle: The default term structure of collateralised loan obligations," CFS Working Paper Series 2002/14, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Andreas Jobst, 2002.
"Loan Securitisation: Default Term Structure and Asset Pricing Based on Loss Prioritisation,"
FMG Discussion Papers
dp422, Financial Markets Group.
- Jobst, Andreas A., 2002. "Loan securitisation: default term structure and asset pricing based on loss prioritisation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24941, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
More about this item
KeywordsInsurance; Insurance Companies; Transactional relationships; Reputation;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-IND-2003-08-17 (Industrial Organization)
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