Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening
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- Diderik Lund & Tore Nilssen, 2004. "Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 29(1), pages 23-41, June.
- Lund,D. & Nilssen,T., 2000. "Cream skimming, dregs skimming, and pooling : on the dynamics of competitive screening," Memorandum 39/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Lund, Diderik & Nilssen, Tore, 2003. "Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening," Working Papers 01-2003, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation : Extention to and Evidence From Insurance Markets," Cahiers de recherche 9134, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Dionne, G. & Doherty, N.A., 1993. "Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets," Papers 9301, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation : Extention to and Evidence From Insurance Markets," Cahiers de recherche 9134, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en Ã©conomie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1977. "Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 407-430.
- Parigi, Bruno M., 1994. "Self selection in a dynamic credit model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 571-590, October.
- Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
- Szpiro, George G, 1986. "Measuring Risk Aversion: An Alternative Approach," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(1), pages 156-159, February.
- Asheim, Geir B. & Nilssen, Tore, 1996.
"Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market,"
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- Asheim, G.B. & Nilssen, T., 1994. "Non-Discriminating Renegotiation in a Competitive Insurance Market," Papers 25, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
- Asheim, G.B. & Nilssen, T., 1995. "Non-Discriminating Renogociation in a Competitive Insurance Market," Memorandum 03/1995, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Nilssen, Tore, 2000. "Consumer lock-in with asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 641-666, May.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jobst, Andreas A., 2002. "The Pricing puzzle: The default term structure of collateralised loan obligations," CFS Working Paper Series 2002/14, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Jobst, Andreas A., 2002.
"Loan securitisation: default term structure and asset pricing based on loss prioritisation,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
24941, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Andreas Jobst, 2002. "Loan Securitisation: Default Term Structure and Asset Pricing Based on Loss Prioritisation," FMG Discussion Papers dp422, Financial Markets Group.
More about this item
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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