The anatomy of a business game
We describe in detail a business game, which has been used extensively in education for a decade. Although the business game is smaller than other games, it is fairly realistic as it includes decisions on investments, production, prices, and advertising. Furthermore, the game has dynamic properties, in that decisions and financial states of the firms carry over from one period to the next. There are not many such detailed descriptions of business games, although this is in demand. Such a complete mathematical description lays ground not only for alterations of the game, but also for developments of new games. It can also provide a link to models used in micro-economic theory.
|Date of creation:||04 Jun 2002|
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- Martin Shubik, 1975.
"Oligopoly, Theory, Communication and Information,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
388, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- George J. Stigler, 1968. "Price and Non-Price Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 149-149.
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