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Oligopoly Theory, Communication, and Information

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  • Shubik, Martin

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  • Shubik, Martin, 1975. "Oligopoly Theory, Communication, and Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 280-283, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:65:y:1975:i:2:p:280-83
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rothschild, Michael, 1973. "Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(6), pages 1283-1308, Nov.-Dec..
    2. Martin Shubik, 1974. "A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. Part XVI. Mathematical Models for a Theory of Money and Financial Institutions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 377, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Edman, Jan & Ståhl, Ingolf, 2002. "The anatomy of a business game," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Business Administration 2002:8, Stockholm School of Economics.
    2. Parkash Chander, 2020. "Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 953-973, December.

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