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Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions

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  • László Á. Kóczy

    () (Department of Economics, Maastricht University)

Abstract

While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the in-dices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.

Suggested Citation

  • László Á. Kóczy, 2008. "Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0820, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:0820
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Max Albert, 2004. "The Voting Power Approach," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 139-146, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Biró, Péter, 2011. "A társadalmi döntések számítástudománya - egy új határterület. European Future Technologies Conference and Exhibition (FET'11) COMSOC (Computational Social Choice) szekció MTA Közgazdaságtudományi Int," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 709-715.
    2. Kóczy, László Á., 2012. "Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 152-158.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banzhaf index; Shapley-Shubik index; a priori voting power; rational players;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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