Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions
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- László Á. Kóczy, 2006. "Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions," Working Paper Series 0803, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management, revised May 2008.
- KÃ³czy LÃ¡szlÃ³ Ã ., 2006. "Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions," Research Memorandum 049, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
References listed on IDEAS
- Max Albert, 2004. "The Voting Power Approach," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 139-146, March.
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- Biró, Péter, 2011. "A társadalmi döntések számítástudománya - egy új határterület. European Future Technologies Conference and Exhibition (FET'11) COMSOC (Computational Social Choice) szekció MTA Közgazdaságtudományi Int," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 709-715.
- Kóczy, László Á., 2012. "Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 152-158.
More about this item
KeywordsBanzhaf index; Shapley-Shubik index; a priori voting power; rational players;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-11-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2008-11-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2008-11-18 (Positive Political Economics)
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