Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions
While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.
|Date of creation:||May 2006|
|Date of revision:||May 2008|
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