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The effective number of relevant parties : how voting power improves Laakso-Taagepera’s index

Author

Listed:
  • Caulier, Jean-François
  • Dumont, Patrick

Abstract

This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of rel- evant parties in an assembly. The most widespread indicator of frag- mentation used in comparative politics is the ‘Effective Number of Par- ties’(ENP), designed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Taking both the number of parties and their relative weights into account, the ENP is arguably a good parsimonious operationalization of the number of ‘relevant’ parties. This index however produces misleading results in single-party ma jority situations as it still indicates that more than one party is relevant in terms of government formation. We propose to modify the ENP formula by replacing proportions of seats by voting power measures. This improved index behaves more in line with Sar- tori’s definition of relevance, without requiring additional information in its construction.

Suggested Citation

  • Caulier, Jean-François & Dumont, Patrick, 2005. "The effective number of relevant parties : how voting power improves Laakso-Taagepera’s index," MPRA Paper 17846, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17846
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17846/1/MPRA_paper_17846.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:85:y:1991:i:04:p:1383-1391_18 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Max Albert, 2004. "The Voting Power Approach," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 139-146, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting power indices; Effective Number of Parties; Party system fragmentation; Relevance; Coalition Formation;

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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