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A Model Explaining Social and Political Change of Party-states Structural and Dynamic Background of Similarities and Differences in Reproduction, reforms, Collapse and Transformation

  • Maria Csanadi

    ()

    (Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

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    I shall argue that the Interactive Party-State (IPS) model (Csanádi, 1997) allows us to place the Chinese and Hungarian party-state structure and dynamics into a common framework. This framework sheds light on the structural reasons behind the different functional effects of reforms. This paper is divided into three major parts. In the first section I summarize the structural and dynamic properties of the IPS model. This is followed by arguments raised regarding its general nature, and consequently, the applicability of the model to China based on common structural and operational grounds. Finally, I will reveal that behind the robust common ground, the different structural specifics may give rise to the divergent development paths. The primary focus is theoretical, with empirical examples provided. Consistent empirical analysis based on the model will be a following undertaking.

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    File URL: http://econ.core.hu/doc/dp/dp/mtdp0101.pdf
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    Paper provided by Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 0101.

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    Length: 75 pages
    Date of creation: Jan 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:0101
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    1. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-62, December.
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    10. David D. Li, 1998. "Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 130, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    11. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
    12. Jefferson, Gary H, 1998. "China's State Enterprises: Public Goods, Externalities, and Coase," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 428-32, May.
    13. Wong, Christine P. W., 1986. "The economics of shortage and problems of reform in Chinese industry," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 363-387, December.
    14. McMillan, John & Naughton, Barry, 1992. "How to Reform a Planned Economy: Lessons from China," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 130-43, Spring.
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