How does external debt impact democratization? Evidence from developing countries
In this paper we empirically discuss whether or not external debt affects country’s governance. Indeed, indebted countries need some political governance reforms in order to send out a positive signal to international financial community and investors; and so improving business climate. However, external debt reduces their flexibility and ability to address associated costs to political governance. Our study focuses on the period 1985-2011 and spans 103 developing countries. To deal with endogeneity issue, we first lag external debt by one year and second propose two-step tobit estimator by instrumenting external debt-to-GDP ratio with real effective exchange rate. Even controlling for various conventional determinants of democratic transitions, we find that external debt constraints indebted countries to move up democracy scale but incite governments to improve investment profile and therefore improving business climate. Furthermore, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs dampen the negative effect of debt on democratic transitions.
|Date of creation:||05 Jun 2015|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00969172v2|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- North, Douglass C., 1989. "Institutions and economic growth: An historical introduction," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(9), pages 1319-1332, September.
- Lane, Philip R. & Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 2007.
"The external wealth of nations mark II: Revised and extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 1970-2004,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 223-250, November.
- Lane, Philip R. & Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 2006. "The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970-2004," CEPR Discussion Papers 5644, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philip R. Lane & Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 2006. "The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities,1970–2004," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp126, IIIS.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2004.
"Do Institutions Cause Growth?,"
NBER Working Papers
10568, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-46, October.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998.
"The Quality of Government,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1847, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Goverment," NBER Working Papers 6727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, . "The Quality of Government," Working Paper 19452, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Ugo Panizza & Andrea Filippo Presbitero, 2012.
"Public Debt and Economic Growth: Is There a Causal Effect?,"
Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers
65, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
- Panizza, Ugo & Presbitero, Andrea F., 2014. "Public debt and economic growth: Is there a causal effect?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 21-41.
- Panizza, Ugo & Presbitero, Andrea F., 2012. "Public debt and economic growth: Is there a causal effect?," POLIS Working Papers 168, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich, 2006.
"What Shapes Attitudes Toward Paying Taxes? Evidence from Multicultural European Countries,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2117, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, 2007. "What Shapes Attitudes Toward Paying Taxes? Evidence from Multicultural European Countries," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 88(2), pages 443-470.
- Friedrich G. Schneider & Benno Torgler, 2006. "What shapes attitudes toward paying taxes? Evidence from multicultural european countries," Economics working papers 2006-08, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich G., 2006. "What Shapes Attitudes Toward Paying Taxes? Evidence from Multicultural European Countries," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt5q14k3wr, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Neumayer, Eric, 2002. "Is Good Governance Rewarded? A Cross-national Analysis of Debt Forgiveness," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 913-930, June.
- Eicher, Theo S. & Schubert, Stefan F. & Turnovsky, Stephen J., 2008. "Dynamic effects of terms of trade shocks: The impact on debt and growth," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 876-896, October.
- Deshpande, Ashwini, 1997. "The debt overhang and the disincentive to invest," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 169-187, February.
- Heckman, James, 2013.
"Sample selection bias as a specification error,"
Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00969172. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.