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An Alternative Model to Basel Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Sofiane Aboura

    () (CEREG - Centre de Recherche sur la gestion et la Finance - DRM UMR 7088 - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres)

  • Emmanuel Lépinette

    () (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The post-crisis financial reforms address the need for systemic regulation, focused not only on individual banks but also on the whole financial system. The regulator principal objective is to set banks' capital requirements equal to international minimum standards in order to mimimise systemic risk. Indeed, Basel agreement is designed to guide a judgement about minimum universal levels of capital and remains mainly microprudential in its focus rather than being macroprudential. An alternative model to Basel framework is derived where systemic risk is taken into account in each bank's dynamic. This might be a new departure for prudential policy. It allows for the regulator to compute capital and risk requirements for controlling systemic risk. Moreover, bank regulation is considered in a two-scale level, either at the bank level or at the system-wide level. We test the adequacy of the model on a data set containing 19 banks of 5 major countries from 2005 to 2012. We compute the capital ratio threshold per year for each bank and each country and we rank them according to their level of fragility. Our results suggest to consider an alternative measure of systemic risk that requires minimal capital ratios that are bank-specific and time-varying.

Suggested Citation

  • Sofiane Aboura & Emmanuel Lépinette, 2013. "An Alternative Model to Basel Regulation," Working Papers hal-00825018, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00825018
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00825018
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Systemic risk; Bank Regulation; Basel Accords;

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