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La tarification des contrats courts : objectifs et instruments

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  • Bruno Coquet

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

Les contrats courts sont utiles au bon fonctionnement de l'économie, mais en France leur développement combiné à leur raccourcissement induit d'importants coûts économiques et sociaux, qui pèsent lourdement sur l'ensemble des agents économiques, mais relativement peu sur la minorité d'entreprises qui en font un usage intensif. L'expérience montre qu'une réglementation plus stricte influe peu sur l'incitation à utiliser les contrats courts ; c'est plutôt sur l'équation économique des entreprises utilisatrices qu'il faut chercher à peser. La théorie économique incline d'ailleurs à moduler le prix des différents contrats de travail en fonction des externalités qu'ils engendrent. L'État pourrait taxer les contrats courts, mais l'assurance chômage y a un intérêt encore plus fort et immédiat. En effet, l'assurance chômage est en première ligne face à ces transformations de l'usage des contrats de travail, et ses règles ont beaucoup évolué pour s'y adapter. Mais elle est confrontée à un paradoxe : bien assurer les contrats courts crée des subventions croisées qui incitent à leur développement. Une modulation du prix des contrats de travail peut s'appuyer sur différents moyens. Mais tous ne se valent pas : l'objectif doit être clair, et l'instrument approprié pour y parvenir. Et tous ne sont pas adaptés aux problèmes français, qui appellent une règle lisible, légère à administrer, applicable à tous les contrats de travail et tous les secteurs (sans exception y compris public), incitant les employeurs à faire des choix économes des deniers de l'assurance ; la tarification doit être contemporaine de ces comportements, mais ni punitive ni symbolique, n'augmentant pas le coût du travail, et ne visant pas à renflouer l'Unedic. Nous décrivons les différents instruments de modulation du prix des contrats de travail. Étant bien entendu que l'absence de taxe est toujours préférable à une mauvaise taxe, la cotisation dégressive en fonction de la durée du contrat de travail, assortie d'un forfait et d'une franchise, apparaît la plus adaptée pour assurer la survie de l'assurance chômage dans un marché du travail marqué par l'usage croissant de contrats de travail toujours plus courts. Nos simulations illustrent que des paramètres finement négociés peuvent conduire à un équilibre raisonnable..

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Coquet, 2017. "La tarification des contrats courts : objectifs et instruments," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03455326, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03455326
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03455326
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bruno Coquet & Eric Heyer, 2018. "Pour une régulation économique des contrats courts sans contraindre les entreprises, en préservant l'assurance," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03404222, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Assurance Chômage; Cotisations sociales; Coût du travail; Contrats courts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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