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Entreprises privées et décision publique en période de crise : un tableau du lobbying des grandes entreprises françaises en 2010

Listed author(s):
  • Madina Rival


    (GREG - CRC - Groupe de recherche en économie et en gestion - Centre de recherche en comptabilité - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM])

Registered author(s):

    There are different ways for firms to influence public decision: corporate political strategies (US name) or lobbying (European name). Lobbying is a key element of "non market strategies" but rarely studied in Europe. There are more and more lobbyists even in France where it was difficult to represent private interests. That is why researchers as well as lobbyists would be interested by a description of those corporate political strategies. The issue of this paper is so: do private firms influence public decisions, especially during social and economic crisis in France and how? We made an inquiry with a questionnaire among the 120 biggest firms in France in 2010 (regarding human resources and turnover). At the end, this study shows four types of firms regarding lobbying: half of respondents have a strong internal political strategy, 25% have an external lobbying, 18 % deal it as communication and 7% do no lobbying!

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00623937.

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    Date of creation: 01 Jul 2011
    Publication status: Published in Première conférence de l'Association Internationale de Recherche en Management Public (AIRMAP), Jul 2011, St Quentin en Yvelines, France. 2011
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00623937
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    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    2. Andrew m. Mclaughlin & GRANT JORDAN & WILLIAM A. MALONEY, 1993. "Corporate Lobbying in the European Community," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 191-212, 06.
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