Entreprises privées et décision publique en période de crise : un tableau du lobbying des grandes entreprises françaises en 2010
There are different ways for firms to influence public decision: corporate political strategies (US name) or lobbying (European name). Lobbying is a key element of "non market strategies" but rarely studied in Europe. There are more and more lobbyists even in France where it was difficult to represent private interests. That is why researchers as well as lobbyists would be interested by a description of those corporate political strategies. The issue of this paper is so: do private firms influence public decisions, especially during social and economic crisis in France and how? We made an inquiry with a questionnaire among the 120 biggest firms in France in 2010 (regarding human resources and turnover). At the end, this study shows four types of firms regarding lobbying: half of respondents have a strong internal political strategy, 25% have an external lobbying, 18 % deal it as communication and 7% do no lobbying!
|Date of creation:||01 Jul 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Première conférence de l'Association Internationale de Recherche en Management Public (AIRMAP), Jul 2011, St Quentin en Yvelines, France. 2011|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00623937|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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- Andrew m. Mclaughlin & GRANT JORDAN & WILLIAM A. MALONEY, 1993. "Corporate Lobbying in the European Community," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 191-212, 06.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
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