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Syndicats de salariés et lobbying :

  • Bourguignon Rémi

    (GREGOR - Groupe de Recherche en Gestion des Organisations - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Paris - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Madina Rival


    (GREG - CRC - Groupe de recherche en économie et en gestion - Centre de recherche en comptabilité - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM])

Registered author(s):

    On lobbyists' registers, in France as well as in Europe, we can find a lot of French trade unions, which could be quite surprising. In USA, lobbying is part of corporate political strategies whereas in Europe, it is a synonymous. Regarding business literature, corporate political strategies are linked with marketing. Mostly, it is part of strategic management. This paper aims at questioning trade unions studies about this topic. Do trade unions lobby public policy makers as well as they go on strike or negotiate? We make an exploratory and qualitative study of trade unions lobbying with documentary analysis and twelve interviews between January and April of 2011. Our field is the seven biggest French trade unions: FO, CFDT, CFTC, CGT, CFE CGC, UNSA, SUD. The results of this empirical work are the identification of French trade unions lobbying with specific issues and strategies.

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00623983.

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    Date of creation: Jul 2011
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published in Première conférence de l'Association Internationale de Recherche en Management Public (AIRMAP), Jul 2011, St Quentin en Yvelines, France. 2011
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00623983
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    1. Chantiri-Chaudemanche, Rouba, 2004. "La normalisation comptable et ses acteurs," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/428, Paris Dauphine University.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Andrew m. Mclaughlin & GRANT JORDAN & WILLIAM A. MALONEY, 1993. "Corporate Lobbying in the European Community," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 191-212, 06.
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