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La qualité de l'audit externe et les mécanismes de gouvernance des entreprises : Une étude empirique menée dans le contexte tunisien

Author

Listed:
  • Pascal Dumontier

    (hec - UNIGE - Université de Genève)

  • Sonda Chtourou

    (FSEG - FSEG Sfax)

  • Soumaya Ayedi

    (FSEGT Tunisia - FSEGT Tunisia)

Abstract

Cette recherche a pour objectif d'étudier l'impact de certaines structures de gouvernance (à savoir la structure de propriété, l'endettement et la composition du conseil d'administration) sur la demande d'une meilleure qualité d'audit externe. Nous appréhendons la qualité d'audit dans le cadre de notre étude par le renommé de l'auditeur externe (‘Big'/'Non Big'). À partir d'un échantillon de 98 sociétés anonymes tunisiennes non financières, nos résultats confirment l'hypothèse de substitution entre d'une part le contrôle exercé par les détenteurs de blocs ainsi que celui exercé par les investisseurs institutionnels et d'autre part la demande d'une qualité différenciée d'audit externe. Les résultats montrent l'existence d'une association significativement positive entre la présence des administrateurs externes indépendants dans le conseil d'administration et la demande de la qualité d'audit. Cependant aucune relation n'a pu être identifiée entre le niveau de l'endettement et la qualité requise d'audit. La taille, la dispersion géographique, le statut de cotation et l'âge de l'entreprise sont des facteurs déterminants du choix d'un auditeur externe fortement réputé

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Dumontier & Sonda Chtourou & Soumaya Ayedi, 2006. "La qualité de l'audit externe et les mécanismes de gouvernance des entreprises : Une étude empirique menée dans le contexte tunisien," Post-Print halshs-00548115, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00548115
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00548115
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    File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00548115/document
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Leila GHARSELLAOUI & Anis JARBOUI, 2017. "External audit quality and transparency of financial communication: the impact of institutional ownership of listed Tunisian firms," Journal of Academic Finance, RED research unit, university of Gabes, Tunisia, vol. 8(1), June.

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