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The demand for the audit in small companies in the UK

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Listed:
  • Jill Collis
  • Robin Jarvis
  • Len Skerratt

Abstract

A recent development of the big GAAP/little GAAP debate in the UK was the proposal to raise the audit exemption thresholds for small companies to EC levels. This paper is based on a survey of the directors of 385 companies conforming to the EC definition of ‘small’. The study investigates whether the three size criteria in company legislation (turnover, balance sheet total and number of employees) are appropriate and sufficient proxies for the demand for the audit by developing and testing a number of theoretical models. The results found that 63% of companies would choose to have their accounts audited if they were exempt, which suggests that the majority of those affected by the proposed increase consider the benefits outweigh the costs. It was found that turnover alone could represent size, but that size was less important than the directors' perceptions of the value of the audit in terms of improving the quality of information and providing a check on internal records. Agency relationships with owners and lenders were also found to be significant influences on the demand for the audit in companies of the size studied.

Suggested Citation

  • Jill Collis & Robin Jarvis & Len Skerratt, 2004. "The demand for the audit in small companies in the UK," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(2), pages 87-100.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:acctbr:v:34:y:2004:i:2:p:87-100
    DOI: 10.1080/00014788.2004.9729955
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    References listed on IDEAS

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