IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/coacre/v36y2019i1p139-167.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Nonrecurring Items in Debt Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Anne Beatty
  • Lin Cheng
  • Tzachi Zach

Abstract

Using a large sample of debt contracts, we study the determinants of excluding nonrecurring items from covenant calculations. We investigate this choice across firms, across items, and through time. We find that nonrecurring items are more likely to be excluded when the agency costs of debt are higher and less likely to be excluded when they predict borrowers' performance. Our evidence further suggests that the interplay between agency costs and nonrecurring items' predictive ability affects the decision to exclude these items from covenant computations. Finally, when examining the exclusion by different nonrecurring item types, we find confirmatory evidence that the probability of exclusion decreases with the predictive ability for borrowers' future performance of major nonrecurring item types. Overall, our research extends the literature on the determinants of contract design and improves understanding of the usefulness of accounting information in debt contracting. Éléments non récurrents des contrats d'emprunt À l'aide d'un vaste échantillon de contrats d'emprunt, les auteurs étudient les déterminants de l'exclusion des éléments non récurrents des calculs afférents aux clauses restrictives. Ils analysent ce choix dans le temps, en fonction des sociétés et des éléments. Ils constatent que les éléments non récurrents sont davantage susceptibles d’être exclus lorsque les coûts de délégation liés à l'emprunt sont plus élevés et moins susceptibles d’être exclus lorsqu'ils permettent de prévoir la performance des emprunteurs. Les données qu'ils recueillent laissent croire au surplus que l'interaction des coûts de délégation et du pouvoir prédictif des éléments non récurrents influe sur la décision d'exclure ces éléments des calculs afférents aux clauses restrictives. Enfin, en examinant l'exclusion selon différents types d’éléments non récurrents, les auteurs démontrent que la probabilité d'exclusion décroît avec le pouvoir prédictif des principales catégories d’éléments non récurrents quant à la performance future des emprunteurs. Dans l'ensemble, l’étude enrichit la documentation relative aux déterminants de l’élaboration des contrats et nous permet de mieux comprendre l'utilité des informations comptables dans la négociation de contrats d'emprunt.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Beatty & Lin Cheng & Tzachi Zach, 2019. "Nonrecurring Items in Debt Contracts," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 139-167, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:36:y:2019:i:1:p:139-167
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12426
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12426
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1911-3846.12426?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edward J. Riedl & Suraj Srinivasan, 2010. "Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation: An Analysis Using Special Items," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(1), pages 8-8, March.
    2. Demerjian, Peter R. & Owens, Edward L., 2016. "Measuring the probability of financial covenant violation in private debt contracts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 433-447.
    3. Demerjian, Peter R., 2011. "Accounting standards and debt covenants: Has the “balance sheet approach” led to a decline in the use of balance sheet covenants?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 178-202.
    4. Justin Murfin, 2012. "The Supply-Side Determinants of Loan Contract Strictness," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(5), pages 1565-1601, October.
    5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    6. Edward J. Riedl & Suraj Srinivasan, 2010. "Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation: An Analysis Using Special Items," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(1), pages 289-332, March.
    7. Flannery, Mark J, 1986. "Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(1), pages 19-37, March.
    8. Amir Sufi, 2007. "Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(2), pages 629-668, April.
    9. Hans B. Christensen & Valeri V. Nikolaev, 2012. "Capital Versus Performance Covenants in Debt Contracts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 75-116, March.
    10. Scott D. Dyreng & Rahul Vashishtha & Joseph Weber, 2017. "Direct Evidence on the Informational Properties of Earnings in Loan Contracts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 371-406, May.
    11. Fields, Thomas D. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Vincent, Linda, 2001. "Empirical research on accounting choice," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 255-307, September.
    12. Charles J. Hadlock & Joshua R. Pierce, 2010. "New Evidence on Measuring Financial Constraints: Moving Beyond the KZ Index," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(5), pages 1909-1940.
    13. Nini, Greg & Smith, David C. & Sufi, Amir, 2009. "Creditor control rights and firm investment policy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 400-420, June.
    14. Asquith, Paul & Beatty, Anne & Weber, Joseph, 2005. "Performance pricing in bank debt contracts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 101-128, December.
    15. Ningzhong Li, 2010. "Negotiated Measurement Rules in Debt Contracts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(5), pages 1103-1144, December.
    16. Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts, 2008. "How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(5), pages 2085-2121, October.
    17. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
    18. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    19. Gu, Zhaoyang & Chen, Ting, 2004. "Analysts' treatment of nonrecurring items in street earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 129-170, December.
    20. Ryan Ball & Robert M. Bushman & Florin P. Vasvari, 2008. "The Debt‐Contracting Value of Accounting Information and Loan Syndicate Structure," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 247-287, May.
    21. Holthausen, Robert W. & Watts, Ross L., 2001. "The relevance of the value-relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 3-75, September.
    22. Anne Beatty & Joseph Weber, 2006. "Accounting Discretion in Fair Value Estimates: An Examination of SFAS 142 Goodwill Impairments," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 257-288, May.
    23. Carol A. Marquardt & Christine I. Wiedman, 2004. "How Are Earnings Managed? An Examination of Specific Accruals," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 21(2), pages 461-491, June.
    24. Ningzhong Li, 2016. "Performance Measures in Earnings‐Based Financial Covenants in Debt Contracts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 1149-1186, September.
    25. Khan, Mozaffar & Watts, Ross L., 2009. "Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2-3), pages 132-150, December.
    26. Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, 2002. "Large–Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 1091-1123, September.
    27. Michael Kirschenheiter & Nahum D. Melumad, 2002. "Can “Big Bath” and Earnings Smoothing Co‐exist as Equilibrium Financial Reporting Strategies?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 761-796, June.
    28. Francis, J & Hanna, JD & Vincent, L, 1996. "Causes and effects of discretionary asset write-offs," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34, pages 117-134.
    29. Beatty, Anne & Weber, Joseph & Yu, Jeff Jiewei, 2008. "Conservatism and Debt," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 154-174, August.
    30. Zhang, Jieying, 2008. "The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 27-54, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wei Chen & Paul Hribar & Sam Melessa, 2023. "Standard Error Biases When Using Generated Regressors in Accounting Research," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 531-569, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Baylis, Richard M. & Burnap, Peter & Clatworthy, Mark A. & Gad, Mahmoud A. & Pong, Christopher K.M., 2017. "Private lenders’ demand for audit," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 78-97.
    2. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
    3. Colleen Honigsberg & Sharon P. Katz & Sunay Mutlu & Gil Sadka, 2021. "State contract law and the use of accounting information in debt contracts," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 124-171, March.
    4. Peter Demerjian & John Donovan & Melissa F. Lewis‐Western, 2020. "Income Smoothing and the Usefulness of Earnings for Monitoring in Debt Contracting," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(2), pages 857-884, June.
    5. Jeffrey Pittman & Yuping Zhao, 2020. "Debt Covenant Restriction, Financial Misreporting, and Auditor Monitoring," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 2145-2185, December.
    6. Freudenberg, Felix & Imbierowicz, Björn & Saunders, Anthony & Steffen, Sascha, 2017. "Covenant violations and dynamic loan contracting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 540-565.
    7. Peter R. Demerjian, 2017. "Uncertainty and debt covenants," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 1156-1197, September.
    8. Zhiming Ma & Derrald Stice & Christopher Williams, 2022. "What's my style? Supply‐side determinants of debt covenant inclusion," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3-4), pages 461-490, March.
    9. Yiwei Dou, 2020. "The Debt-Contracting Value of Accounting Numbers and Financial Covenant Renegotiation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1124-1148, March.
    10. Takuma Kochiyama & Ryosuke Nakamura & Akinobu Shuto, 2021. "How do bank lenders use borrowers’ financial statements? Evidence from a survey of Japanese banks," CARF F-Series CARF-F-522, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    11. Anna M. Costello & Regina Wittenberg‐Moerman*, 2011. "The Impact of Financial Reporting Quality on Debt Contracting: Evidence from Internal Control Weakness Reports," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 97-136, March.
    12. Hans B. Christensen & Valeri V. Nikolaev & Regina Wittenberg‐Moerman, 2016. "Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 397-435, May.
    13. Kothari, S.P. & Ramanna, Karthik & Skinner, Douglas J., 2010. "Implications for GAAP from an analysis of positive research in accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 246-286, December.
    14. Christensen, Hans B. & Macciocchi, Daniele & Morris, Arthur & Nikolaev, Valeri V., 2022. "Financial shocks to lenders and the composition of financial covenants," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1).
    15. Urooj Khan & Alvis K. Lo, 2019. "Bank Lending Standards and Borrower Accounting Conservatism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 5337-5359, November.
    16. Hollander, Stephan & Verriest, Arnt, 2016. "Bridging the gap: the design of bank loan contracts and distance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 399-419.
    17. Tan, Liang, 2013. "Creditor control rights, state of nature verification, and financial reporting conservatism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-22.
    18. Peter R. Demerjian & John Donovan & Chad R. Larson, 2016. "Fair Value Accounting and Debt Contracting: Evidence from Adoption of SFAS 159," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 1041-1076, September.
    19. Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina, 2008. "The role of information asymmetry and financial reporting quality in debt trading: Evidence from the secondary loan market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2-3), pages 240-260, December.
    20. Anna Bergman Brown, 2016. "Institutional Differences and International Private Debt Markets: A Test Using Mandatory IFRS Adoption," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 679-723, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:36:y:2019:i:1:p:139-167. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1911-3846 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.