The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers
This paper examines the ex post and ex ante benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers in the debt contracting process. I expect conservatism to benefit lenders ex post through the timely signaling of default risk, as manifested by accelerated covenant violations, and to benefit borrowers ex ante through lower initial interest rates. Consistent with these predictions, I find that more conservative borrowers are more likely to violate debt covenants following a negative price shock, and that lenders offer lower interest rates to more conservative borrowers.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Press, Eric G. & Weintrop, Joseph B., 1990. "Accounting-based constraints in public and private debt agreements : Their association with leverage and impact on accounting choice," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1-3), pages 65-95, January.
- Sweeney, Amy Patricia, 1994. "Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting responses," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 281-308, May.
- Leuz, Christian & Nanda, Dhananjay & Wysocki, Peter D., 2003. "Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 505-527, September.
- Roychowdhury, Sugata & Watts, Ross L., 2007. "Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, market-to-book and conservatism in financial reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 2-31, September.
- Asquith, Paul & Beatty, Anne & Weber, Joseph, 2005. "Performance pricing in bank debt contracts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 101-128, December.
- DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda & Skinner, Douglas J., 1994. "Accounting choice in troubled companies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 113-143, January.
- Duke, Joanne C. & Hunt, Herbert III, 1990. "An empirical examination of debt covenant restrictions and accounting-related debt proxies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1-3), pages 45-63, January.
- Holthausen, Robert W. & Watts, Ross L., 2001. "The relevance of the value-relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 3-75, September.
- Ilia D. Dichev, 2002. "Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 1091-1123, 09.
- DeFond, Mark L. & Jiambalvo, James, 1994. "Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 145-176, January.
- Basu, Sudipta, 1997. "The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 3-37, December.
- Beatty, Anne & Ramesh, K. & Weber, Joseph, 2002. "The importance of accounting changes in debt contracts: the cost of flexibility in covenant calculations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 205-227, June.
- Givoly, Dan & Hayn, Carla, 2000. "The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals: Has financial reporting become more conservative?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 287-320, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:45:y:2008:i:1:p:27-54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.