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Transferts négociés de blocs de contrôle, bénéfices privés et protection des actionnaires minoritaires

  • Salma Fourati

    (ISG Tunis - ISG Tunis)

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    Les opérations de transferts de blocs d'actions offrent un cadre d'analyse particulièrement intéressant pour évaluer l'ampleur de ces bénéfices privés du contrôle. Par ailleurs, les transferts de blocs de contrôle peuvent avoir des conséquences importantes sur les différentes parties (la société visée, l'acquéreur et les actionnaires externes) notamment en présence d'un mécanisme juridique de protection des actionnaires minoritaires telle que celui de la garantie de cours (adopté en France). L'objectif de ce travail est d'abord d'estimer l'ampleur des bénéfices privés du contrôle à travers la prime payée lors des négociations privées de blocs de contrôle, ensuite, d'évaluer l'efficacité de la règle de garantie de cours à protéger les intérêts des actionnaires minoritaires. Nos résultats montrent des niveaux élevés des bénéfices privés du contrôle : la prime payée par les acquéreurs de blocs de contrôle est de l'ordre de 20%. Notre étude révèle que le mécanisme de garantie de cours contribue à protéger les actionnaires minoritaires lors des transferts de blocs de contrôle, en particulier, l'utilité de cette réglementation est plus justifiée pour les transferts de blocs qui modifient la structure de propriété de l'entreprise visée ; d'un autre coté, le choix des actionnaires minoritaires quant à l'exercice de leur option de sortie peut être orienté par l'initiateur à travers l'information communiquée.

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00524890.

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    Date of creation: May 2008
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    Publication status: Published - Presented, LA COMPTABILITE, LE CONTRÔLE ET L'AUDIT ENTRE CHANGEMENT ET STABILITE, 2008, France
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00524890
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00524890/en/
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