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Opinion Dynamics and Political Persuasion

Author

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  • David Desmarchelier

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Thomas Lanzi

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

This paper proposes to adapt a simple disease spread model for political persuasion. More precisely, we observe how a policy presented by a leader prevails in a committee divided into two groups: supporters and opponents. At each date, agents from the two groups meet and influence each other due to the leader's persuasion force. If the leader's persuasion force dominates (is dominated), then some opponents (supporters) become supporters (opponents). Moreover, agents can also change their opinions simply because of the symbolic attraction force exerted by the group or the leader. In the long run, it appears that a high attraction force can compensate for a lack of persuasion force to ensure that more than half of the members subscribe to the policy presented by the leader. Such a situation is stable. Conversely, a high persuasion force, when the attraction force of the leader's group is relatively low, can generate the occurrence of a two-period cycle through a flip bifurcation such that the leader loses the majority from one period to another.

Suggested Citation

  • David Desmarchelier & Thomas Lanzi, 2023. "Opinion Dynamics and Political Persuasion," Post-Print hal-04711036, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04711036
    DOI: 10.3917/redp.336.0907
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04711036v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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