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Letting Offenders Choose Their Own Punishment ?

Author

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  • Gilles Grolleau

    (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier)

  • Murat Mungan

    (George Mason University [Fairfax])

  • Naoufel Mzoughi

    (ECODEVELOPPEMENT - Ecodéveloppement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

Punishment menus allow offenders to choose the punishment to which they will be subjected from a set of options. We present several behaviorally informed rationales for why punishment menus may serve as effective deterrents, notably by causing people to refrain from entering a calculative mindset; reducing their psychological reactance; causing them to reconsider the reputational impacts of punishment; and reducing suspicions about whether the act is enforced for rent-seeking purposes. We argue that punishment menus can outperform the traditional single punishment if these effects can be harnessed properly. Our observations thus constitute a challenge, based on behavioral arguments, to the conventional view that adding (possibly unexercised) punishment options to an existing punishment scheme is unlikely to increase deterrence or welfare. We explain how heterogeneities among individuals can pose problems to designing effective punishment menus and discuss potential solutions. After explaining how punishment menus, if designed and implemented benevolently, can serve socially desirable goals, we caution against their possible misuse by self-interested governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilles Grolleau & Murat Mungan & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2022. "Letting Offenders Choose Their Own Punishment ?," Post-Print hal-03694337, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03694337
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4129344
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03694337
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Insaf Békir & Sana El. Harbi & Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi & Angela Sutan, 2016. "The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 37(7), pages 461-473, October.
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    3. Antoine Beretti & Charles Figuières & Gilles Grolleau, 2013. "Using Money to Motivate Both ‘Saints’ and ‘Sinners’: a Field Experiment on Motivational Crowding-Out," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 63-77, February.
    4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    5. Mungan, Murat C., 2011. "Welfare enhancing regulation exemptions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 249-255.
    6. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 403-454, Elsevier.
    7. Bruno Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2004. "Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 377-401, September.
    8. Cooter, Robert, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt3w34j60j, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    9. Carl Mellström & Magnus Johannesson, 2008. "Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(4), pages 845-863, June.
    10. Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski, 2017. "Law Enforcement with a Democratic Government," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 19(1), pages 162-201.
    11. Katherine Farrow & Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2018. "What in the Word! The Scope for the Effect of Word Choice on Economic Behavior," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(4), pages 557-580, November.
    12. Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman, 2002. "Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 116-140, January.
    13. Antoine Beretti & Charles Figuières & Gilles Grolleau, 2019. "How to turn crowding-out into crowding-in? An innovative instrument and some law-related examples," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 417-438, December.
    14. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    15. Miceli, Thomas J. & Mungan, Murat C., 2021. "An economic theory of optimal enactment and enforcement of laws," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    16. Cooter, Robert, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 585-608, June.
    17. Murat C Mungan, 2021. "Rewards versus Imprisonment," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(2), pages 432-480.
    18. Robert Cooter, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," CESifo Working Paper Series 161, CESifo.
    19. Fluet, Claude & Mungan, Murat C., 2022. "Laws and norms with (un)observable actions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    20. Murat C. Mungan & Thomas J. Miceli, 2021. "Legislating for profit and optimal Eighth‐Amendment review," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1403-1416, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dejan Glavas & Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2023. "Greening the greenwashers – How to push greenwashers towards more sustainable trajectories," Post-Print hal-03908838, HAL.

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    Keywords

    behavioral economics; economics of crime; punishment menu;
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