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Debates and dissident inside the FOMC during WW2

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  • Etienne Farvaque

    (EQUIPPE - Economie Quantitative, Intégration, Politiques Publiques et Econométrie - Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies - Université de Lille, Sciences Humaines et Sociales - PRES Université Lille Nord de France - Université de Lille, Droit et Santé)

  • Antoine Parent

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Piotr Stanek

Abstract

We demonstrate that even though during WWII the interest rate was close to zero supporting the financing of the military effort, dissent inside the FOMC occurred with a similar frequency to other policy episodes. Our analysis highlights that the debates which resulted in dissents turned around two broad issues: the size of the Fed's balance sheet as well as the functioning of and communication with financial markets. Thus, we argue that the conventional view depicting the Fed as merely accommodating treasury needs should be revised. Our detailed investigation of dissents emphasises the modernity of the objections raised by Fed officials.

Suggested Citation

  • Etienne Farvaque & Antoine Parent & Piotr Stanek, 2018. "Debates and dissident inside the FOMC during WW2," Post-Print hal-03567133, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03567133
    DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2018.1517752
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03567133v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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