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Going with the flow: corruption in tax agencies

Author

Listed:
  • Hamilton Carvalho

    (USP - Universidade de São Paulo = University of São Paulo)

  • Joaquim Rocha

    (USP - Universidade de São Paulo = University of São Paulo)

  • Marcelo Ramos

    (USP - Universidade de São Paulo = University of São Paulo)

  • Eduardo Franco

    (USP - Universidade de São Paulo = University of São Paulo)

  • José Mazzon

    (USP - Universidade de São Paulo = University of São Paulo)

Abstract

Corruption is a widespread "wicked " problem in the world, whose roots are still poorly understood by policy makers. The paper summarized the findings from the behavioral ethics literature, assembling a model to explain the creation and solidification of a culture of corruption in tax agencies in Brazil. The model represents the conversion of honest tax auditors into corrupt ones based on a process of rationalization that responds to social norms, the magnitude of illegal rewards, perceived risk and job quality. Four policies are simulated and only a policy that combines multiple interventions produces positive results. Overall, the model shows that a culture of corruption can be created and disseminated in few years, becoming resistant to change inasmuch as corrupt auditors occupy management positions and create alliances with politicians.

Suggested Citation

  • Hamilton Carvalho & Joaquim Rocha & Marcelo Ramos & Eduardo Franco & José Mazzon, 2016. "Going with the flow: corruption in tax agencies," Post-Print hal-01370096, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01370096
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01370096
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. George Loewenstein, 2000. "Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 426-432, May.
    4. Dan Ariely & Nina Mazar, 2006. "Dishonesty in everyday life and its policy implications," Working Papers 06-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    5. Gino, Francesca & Ayal, Shahar & Ariely, Dan, 2013. "Self-serving altruism? The lure of unethical actions that benefit others," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 285-292.
    6. Mead, N.L. & Baumeister, R.F. & Gino, F. & Schweitzer, M.E. & Ariely, D., 2009. "Too tired to tell the truth : Self-control resource depletion and dishonesty," Other publications TiSEM c60167a3-c3aa-4b83-9192-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Kirchler,Erich, 2007. "The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521876742.
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    Keywords

    Corruption; Behavioral ethics; Brazil;
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