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Envy, Schadenfreude and evaluation : understanding the strange growing of individual performance appraisal

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  • Bénédicte Vidaillet

    (IRG - Institut de Recherche en Gestion - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12)

Abstract

A key question is to understand why, paradoxically, despite the harmful effects of the evaluation systems and the complaints they generate, most people are favorable to their development. What are their reasons? Why would people support practices that end up affecting them negatively? In this chapter, we will make the case that envy is one trigger that explains the growing demand for individual performance appraisal. Such a statement leads us to look with new eyes into the link between envy and contemporary evaluation systems: Envy is not only a consequence of those systems, but also may be partly at the root of their development.

Suggested Citation

  • Bénédicte Vidaillet, 2016. "Envy, Schadenfreude and evaluation : understanding the strange growing of individual performance appraisal," Post-Print hal-01366994, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01366994
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01366994v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bénédicte Vidaillet, 2008. "Psychoanalytic contributions to understanding envy : classic and contemporary contributions," Post-Print hal-00323973, HAL.
    2. Courty, Pascal & Marschke, Gerald, 1997. "Measuring Government Performance: Lessons from a Federal Job-Training Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 383-388, May.
    3. Kathryn H. Anderson & Richard V. Burkhauser & Jennie E. Raymond, 1993. "The Effect of Creaming on Placement Rates under the Job Training Partnership Act," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 46(4), pages 613-624, July.
    4. Bénédicte Vidaillet, 2007. "A Lacanian theory's contribution to the study of workplace envy : a case study," Post-Print hal-00228806, HAL.
    5. Prendergast, Canice, 1993. "A Theory of "Yes Men."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 757-770, September.
    6. Bénédicte Vidaillet, 2008. "Workplace envy," Post-Print hal-00323936, HAL.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gilles Arnaud & Bénédicte Vidaillet, 2018. "Clinical and critical: The Lacanian contribution to management and organization studies," Post-Print hal-01591534, HAL.

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