When the international lender of last resort faces a " too big to fail " sovereign borrower : the " jeu de faux semblants "
This paper aims to analyse the relationship between Russia and the IMF. The model used is one with a multilateral lender, whose utility depends on the stability of the international financial system, and a borrowing country, whose debt threatens this stability.
|Date of creation:||23 May 2000|
|Publication status:||Published in "Reshaping the architecture of the international financial system", C.D.C./C.E.P.I.I./C.E.F.I., May 2000, Sienne, Italy|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00731546|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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