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When the international lender of last resort faces a " too big to fail " sovereign borrower : the " jeu de faux semblants "

Author

Listed:
  • Cécile Bastidon

    () (LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - UTLN - Université de Toulon)

  • Philippe Gilles

    (LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - UTLN - Université de Toulon)

Abstract

This paper aims to analyse the relationship between Russia and the IMF. The model used is one with a multilateral lender, whose utility depends on the stability of the international financial system, and a borrowing country, whose debt threatens this stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Cécile Bastidon & Philippe Gilles, 2000. "When the international lender of last resort faces a " too big to fail " sovereign borrower : the " jeu de faux semblants "," Post-Print hal-00731546, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00731546
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00731546
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Dooley, Michael P, 2000. "A Model of Crises in Emerging Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 256-272, January.
    3. Atkeson, Andrew, 1991. "International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1069-1089, July.
    4. Pitchford, Rohan, 1998. "Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 251-259, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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