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New method to detect convergence in simple multi-period market games with infinite large strategy spaces

Author

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  • Jørgen Vitting Andersen

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Philippe de Peretti

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We introduce a new methodology that enables the detection of onset of convergence towards Nash equilibria, in simple repeated-games with infinite large strategy spaces. The method works by constraining on a special and finite subset of strategies. We illustrate how the method can predict (in special time periods) with a high success rate the action of participants in a series of experiments.

Suggested Citation

  • Jørgen Vitting Andersen & Philippe de Peretti, 2018. "New method to detect convergence in simple multi-period market games with infinite large strategy spaces," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01960900, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01960900
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01960900
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    multi-period games; infinite strategy space; decoupling; bounded rationality; agent-based modeling;

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