Do broad patents deter research cooperation ?
The authors develop a theoretical model where two competing firms need access to basic knowledge that only one firm owns. They determine the impact of an imperfect property right on the incentive to transfer that knowledge to the competitor. They compare these transfer strategies. (i) Patenting may lead to litigation costs that depend on the competition toughness. (ii) Keeping the knowledge secret involves no licence revenue but ensures a monopoly profit. (iii) The firm can also coooperate with the competitor and thereby avoids litigation. They show that whenever competition between both firms is low, making patentable basic knowledge promotes knowledge transfer through research cooperation.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:|
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- Claude d'Aspremont & Sudipto Bhattacharya & Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet, 2000.
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- Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2006.
"Patents VS Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover,"
Sciences Po publications
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- Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2006. "Patents vs. Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(6), pages 1112-1147, December.
- Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Patents vs Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover," Working Papers w0064, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), revised Feb 2006.
- Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2005. "Patents vs trade secrets: knowledge licensing and spillover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 444, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Klaus Kultti & Tuomas Takalo & Juuso Toikka, 2007. "Secrecy versus patenting," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 22-42, 03.
- Trommetter, M., 2008. "Intellectual property rights in agricultural and agro-food biotechnologies to 2030 (© OECD International Futures Programme)," Working Papers 200805, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
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