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Sincere voting, strategic voting A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems

Author

Listed:
  • Isabelle Lebon

    (CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), University of Caen Normandie, 14 000 Caen, France, and Condorcet Center)

  • Antoinette Baujard

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne (UMR CNRS 5824), University Jean Monnet and University of Lyon, 42 023 Saint-Etienne, France)

  • Frédéric Gavrel

    (CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), University of Caen Normandie, 14 000 Caen, France, and Condorcet Center)

  • Herrade Igersheim

    (CNRS and Beta (UMR CNRS 7522), University of Strasbourg, 67 085 Strasbourg, France)

  • Jean-François Laslier

    (CNRS and PJSE (UMR CNRS 8545), 75014 Paris, France)

Abstract

In two laboratory surveys run in France during the 2014 European Elections, we asked the participants to provide their personal evaluations of the parties in terms of ideological proximity, and asked how they would vote under three proportional, closed-list voting rules : the (official) single-vote rule, a split-my-vote rule, and a list-approval rule. The paper analyzes the relation between opinions and vote, under the three systems. Compared to multi-vote rules, the single-vote system leads to voters’ decisions that are more often strategic but also more often sincere. Sincere voting and strategic voting therefore appear to be more consistent than contradictory. Multi-vote rules allow the voter to express complex behavior, and the concepts of “sincere” and “strategic” voting are not always sufficient to render this complexity.

Suggested Citation

  • Isabelle Lebon & Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier, 2018. "Sincere voting, strategic voting A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems," Working Papers 1833, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1833
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Herrade Igersheim, 2007. "Du paradoxe libéral-parétien à un concept de métaclassement des préférences," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 73(2), pages 173-192.
    2. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader rule: a model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate," Post-Print hal-00363218, HAL.
    3. Antoinette Baujard, 2014. "Individual behavior under evaluative voting. A comparison between laboratory and In Situ Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00981556, HAL.
    4. Karine van der Straeten & Romain Lachat & Jean-François Laslier, 2018. "Strategic Voting in Multiwinner Elections with Approval Balloting: An Application to the 2011 Regional Government Election in Zurich," Post-Print halshs-02103123, HAL.
    5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antoinette Baujard & Isabelle Lebon, 2022. "Not-so-strategic Voters," Working Papers 2201, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    2. Antoinette Baujard & Isabelle Lebon, 2022. "Not-so-strategic voters. Evidence from an in situ experiment during the 2017 French presidential election [Wp Gate 2022-2201]," Working Papers halshs-03607809, HAL.
    3. Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 191-220, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Approval voting; Cumulative voting; Proportional systems; Contextualized experiment; Laboratory experiment; Strategic voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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