On the Tacit Collusion Equilibria of an Investment Timing Game
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References listed on IDEAS
- Marcel Boyer & Pierre Lasserre & Michel Moreaux, 2007. "The Dynamics of Industry Investments," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-09, CIRANO.
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KeywordsReal options; Duopoly; Collusion; Investment;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-01-31 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2009-01-31 (Industrial Competition)
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