On the Tacit Collusion Equilibria of an Investment Timing Game
This note further characterizes the tacit collusion equilibria in the investment timing game of Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux . Tacit collusion equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either finite time investments (type 1) or infinite delay (type 2). The relationship between equilibria and common demand forms is not immediately apparent. We provide the full necessary and sufficient conditions for existence.A simple condition on demand primitives is derived that determines the type of equilibria. Common demand forms are then shown to illustrate both finite-time and infinite-delay tacit collusion.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Working Paper Gate 2008-34. 2008|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00373952|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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- Marcel Boyer & Pierre Lasserre & Michel Moreaux, 2007. "The Dynamics of Industry Investments," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-09, CIRANO.
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