Russian Banking System: Stability Factors In the Wake of 2008-2009 Crisis
This paper discusses different approaches to theoretical and empirical models of bank defaults. Through constructed binary probabilistic models of defaults the paper reveals key factors which have an impact on the viability of Russian banks during the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009. Policy recommendations of the Central Bank of Russia and the banking supervision and regulation aimed at preventing bank defaults in the event of such crises in the future are formulated based on the model results.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:||2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (495) 629-6413
Fax: (495) 203-8816
Web page: http://www.iep.ru/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2009.
"Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of Intervention,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1588-1607, September.
- Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2007. "Bank runs and institutions : the perils of intervention," Working Paper 07-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Arena, Marco, 2008.
"Bank failures and bank fundamentals: A comparative analysis of Latin America and East Asia during the nineties using bank-level data,"
Journal of Banking & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 299-310, February.
- Marco Arena, 2005. "Bank Failures and Bank Fundamentals: A Comparative Analysis of Latin America and East Asia during the Nineties using Bank-Level Data," Working Papers 05-19, Bank of Canada.
- Anatoly Peresetsky & Alexandr Karminsky & Sergei Golovan, 2011.
"Probability of default models of Russian banks,"
Economic Change and Restructuring,
Springer, vol. 44(4), pages 297-334, November.
- Asli DemirgÃ¼Ã§-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, 1998. "The Determinants of Banking Crises in Developing and Developed Countries," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(1), pages 81-109, March.
- James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003.
"Equilibrium Bank Runs,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
- Theodosios Temzelides, 1995.
"Evolution, coordination, and banking panics,"
95-27, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983.
"Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
- Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, 2005. "Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1293-1327, 06.
- Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2010. "Banking panics and policy responses," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 404-419, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gai:wpaper:0049. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Hugues)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.