Risk aversion, risk sharing, and joint bidding: a study of outer continental shelf petroleum auctions
The bidding decision by firms in OCS petroleum auctions is modeled as an application of the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion. This theory is apt since OCS leases are innately risky investments: during 1954-1969, 77 percent of the Gulf of Mexico leases were unprofitable, while the average bonus (price) was $2,228,000. The model of the simultaneous choices of bid level, share in joint bids, and bids on other tracts in the same auction is tested on 17 auctions during 1968-1975. Empirical results support the hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion and the risk-pooling explanation of joint bidding.
|Date of creation:||1985|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Land Economics, November 1985, 61(4), pp. 372-86|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.stlouisfed.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hayne E. Leland., 1975.
"Optimal Risk Sharing and the Leasing of Natural Resources, with Application to Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS,"
Research Program in Finance Working Papers
38, University of California at Berkeley.
- Leland, Hayne E, 1978. "Optimal Risk Sharing and the Leasing of Natural Resources, with Application to Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(3), pages 413-37, August.
- Samuelson, Paul A, 1977. "St. Petersburg Paradoxes: Defanged, Dissected, and Historically Described," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 24-55, March.
- Masson, Robert Tempest, 1971. "Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(6), pages 1278-92, Nov.-Dec..
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:1985-014. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anna Xiao)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.