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Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance

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  • Masson, Robert Tempest

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  • Masson, Robert Tempest, 1971. "Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(6), pages 1278-1292, Nov.-Dec..
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:79:y:1971:i:6:p:1278-92
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eaton, Jonathan & Rosen, Harvey S, 1983. " Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(5), pages 1489-1505, December.
    2. George-Levi Gayle & Robert A. Miller, 2009. "Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1740-1769, December.
    3. Abe, Naohito & Gaston, Noel & Kubo, Katsuyuki, 2005. "Executive pay in Japan: the role of bank-appointed monitors and the Main Bank relationship," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 371-394, August.
    4. White, Lourdes Ferreira, 1996. "Executive compensation and dividend policy," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 335-358, July.
    5. George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, "undated". "Promotion, Turover and Compensation in the Executive Market," GSIA Working Papers 2008-E32, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    6. Trechter, David D. & McGregor, Murray J. & Murray-Prior, Roy B., 2003. "A Neo-Institutional Assessment of Cooperative Evolution: Comparing the Australian Wheat Board and the Fonterra Dairy Group," 2003 Annual Meeting, October 29 31801, NCERA-194 Research on Cooperatives.
    7. Zhou, Xianming, 1999. "Executive compensation and managerial incentives: A comparison between Canada and the United States1," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 277-301, September.
    8. John M. Abowd, 1989. "Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Subsequent Corporate Performance?," NBER Working Papers 3149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Amanda L. Coxbill & Lee W. Sanning & Sherrill Shaffer, 2009. "Market Reaction To The Announcement Of A Male-To-Female Ceo Turnover," CAMA Working Papers 2009-13, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    10. John M. Abowd & David S. Kaplan, 1999. "Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 145-168, Fall.
    11. Steven W. Millsaps & Mack Ott, 1985. "Risk aversion, risk sharing, and joint bidding: a study of outer continental shelf petroleum auctions," Working Papers 1985-014, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    12. Sun, Jerry & Cahan, Steven F. & Emanuel, David, 2009. "Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1507-1519, August.
    13. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Richard P. Chaykowski & Randy A. Ehrenberg, 1986. "Merit Pay for School Superintendents?," NBER Working Papers 1954, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Scott, John L. & Anderson, Randy I. & Webb, James R., 2005. "The labor-leisure choice in executive compensation plans: Does too much pay reduce REIT performance?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 151-163.
    15. Elston, Julie Ann & Goldberg, Lawrence G., 2003. "Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1391-1410, July.
    16. H Peyton Young & Lucas Merrill Brown, 2016. "The Diffusion of a Social Innovation: Executive Stock Options from 1936–2005," Economics Series Working Papers 777, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    17. Pukthuanthong, Kuntara & Roll, Richard & Walker, Thomas, 2007. "How employee stock options and executive equity ownership affect long-term IPO operating performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 695-720, December.
    18. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Taye Mengistae & Lixin Colin Xu, 2004. "Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 615-638, July.
    20. Wilbur G. Lewellen, -, 1997. "Hatékonyság és eredményesség
      [Efficiency and effectiveness]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 3-12.
    21. Hanlon, Michelle & Rajgopal, Shivaram & Shevlin, Terry, 2003. "Are executive stock options associated with future earnings?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 3-43, December.

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