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Real effects of bank competition

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  • Nicola Cetorelli

Abstract

Does banking market power contribute to the formation of non-financial industries populated by few, large firms, or does it instead enhance industry entry? Theoretical arguments could be made to support either side. The banking industry of European Union (EU) countries has been significantly deregulated in the early 1990s. Under the old regime, cross-border expansions were heavily constrained, while after deregulation banks from EU countries have instead been allowed to branch freely into other EU countries. Concurrently to the process of deregulation, European banking industries have also experienced a significant process of consolidation. Exploiting such significant innovations affecting the banking industries of EU countries, this paper explores whether changes in bank competition have in fact played a role on the market structure of non-financial industries. Empirical evidence is derived from a panel of manufacturing industries in 29 OECD countries, both EU and non-EU members, adopting a methodology that allows controlling for other determinants of industry market structure common across industries, across countries or related to time passing. The evidence suggests that the overall process of enhanced competition in EU banking markets has lead to markets in non-financial sectors characterized by lower average firm size.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicola Cetorelli, 2004. "Real effects of bank competition," Working Paper Series WP-04-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-04-03
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank competition ; Bank mergers;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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