IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedcwp/1204.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Privately optimal contracts and suboptimal outcomes in a model of agency costs

Author

Listed:
  • Carlstrom, Charles T.
  • Fuerst, Timothy S.
  • Paustian, Matthias

    () (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland)

Abstract

This paper derives the privately optimal lending contract in the celebrated fi nancial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The privately optimal contract includes indexation to the aggregate return on capital and household consumption. Although privately optimal, this contract is not welfare maximizing as it exacerbates fluctuations in real activity. The household’s desire to hedge business cycle risk, leads, via the fi nancial contract, to greater business cycle risk. The welfare cost of the privately optimal contract (when compared to the planner outcome) is quite large. A countercyclical tax on lender profi ts comes close to achieving the planner outcome

Suggested Citation

  • Carlstrom, Charles T. & Fuerst, Timothy S. & Paustian, Matthias, 2012. "Privately optimal contracts and suboptimal outcomes in a model of agency costs," Working Paper 1204, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:1204
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.clevelandfed.org/~/media/content/newsroom%20and%20events/publications/working%20papers/2012/wp%201239%20privately%20owned%20contracts%20and%20suboptimal%20outcomes%20pdf.pdf?la=en
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Matteo Iacoviello, 2005. "House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 739-764, June.
    2. Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy Fuerst, 2007. "Asset Prices, Nominal Rigidities, and Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 256-275, April.
    3. Mark Gertler, 1992. "Financial Capacity and Output Fluctuations in an Economy with Multi-Period Financial Relationships," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 455-472.
    4. Olivier Jeanne & Anton Korinek, 2010. "Excessive Volatility in Capital Flows: A Pigouvian Taxation Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 403-407, May.
    5. Faia, Ester & Monacelli, Tommaso, 2007. "Optimal interest rate rules, asset prices, and credit frictions," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(10), pages 3228-3254, October.
    6. Guido Lorenzoni, 2008. "Inefficient Credit Booms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 809-833.
    7. Fiorella De Fiore & Oreste Tristani, 2013. "Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model of the Credit Channel," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(571), pages 906-931, September.
    8. Krishnamurthy, Arvind, 2003. "Collateral constraints and the amplification mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 277-292, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Carlstrom, Charles T. & Fuerst, Timothy S. & Ortiz, Alberto & Paustian, Matthias, 2014. "Estimating contract indexation in a Financial Accelerator Model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 130-149.
    2. Mikhail Dmitriev & Jonathan Hoddenbagh, 2013. "The Financial Accelerator and the Optimal Lending Contract," 2013 Papers pdm9, Job Market Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contracts; Financial markets;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:1204. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (4D Library). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/frbclus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.