Resistance to Change
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Dow, James & Perotti, Enrico, 2010. "Resistance to Change," Institutions and Markets Papers 60752, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
References listed on IDEAS
- Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
- repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
- Acemoglu, Daron, 2003.
"Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
- Daron Acemoglu, 2002. "Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics," NBER Working Papers 9377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brusco, Sandro & Panunzi, Fausto, 2005.
"Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 659-681, April.
- Panunzi, Fausto & Brusco, Sandro, 2000. "Reallocation of Corporate Resources and Managerial Incentives in Internal Capital Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2532, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sandro Brusco & Fausto Panunzi, 2002. "Reallocation of Corporate Resources and Managerial Incentives in Internal Capital Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 735, CESifo.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008.
"Contracts as Reference Points,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2006. "Contracts as Reference Points," NBER Working Papers 12706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2006. "Contracts as Reference Points," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 170, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Stephen Morris & Stephen Coate, 1999.
"Policy Persistence,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1327-1336, December.
- Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, "undated". "Policy Persistence," Penn CARESS Working Papers 8a66677895e9fcb3f6d813c0c, Penn Economics Department.
- Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, "undated". "Policy Persistence," CARESS Working Papres 97-2, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, "undated". ""Policy Persistence ''," CARESS Working Papres 95-19, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- James A. Robinson & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 126-130, May.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1994.
"A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 841-879.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 233, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," Working papers 592, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," NBER Working Papers 3906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Per Krusell & José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 1996.
"Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(2), pages 301-329.
- Krusell, P. & Rios-Rull, J.V., 1993. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth," Papers 547, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Christensen, Clayton M., 1993. "The Rigid Disk Drive Industry: A History of Commercial and Technological Turbulence," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 531-588, January.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Cronin, Hugh & McGuinness, Seamus, 2014.
"Examining the Relationship between Employee Resistance to Changes in Job Conditions and Wider Organisational Change: Evidence from Ireland,"
IZA Discussion Papers
8441, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Cronin, Hugh & McGuinness, Seamus, 2014. "Examining the Relationship between Employee Resistance to Changes in Job Conditions and Wider Organisational Change: Evidence from Ireland," Papers WP490, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Uwe Dulleck & Paul Frijters, 2004. "Why the US and not Brazil? Old Elites and the Development of a Modern Economy," Vienna Economics Papers vie0408, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016.
"Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 137-192, March.
- Garicano, Luis & Rayo, Luis, 2015. "Why organizations fail: models and cases," CEPR Discussion Papers 10395, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Uwe Dulleck & Paul Frijters, 2004.
"Why the US and not Brazil? Old Elites and the Development of a Modern Economy,"
Vienna Economics Papers
0408, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Uwe Dulleck & Paul Frijters, 2004. "Why the US and not Brazil? Old Elites and the Development of a Modern Economy," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 186b, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
- Paul Frijters & Uwe Dulleck, 2004. "Why the US and not Brazil? Old Elites and the Development of a Modern Economy," Paul Frijters Discussion Papers 2004-1, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
- Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005.
"Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth,"
Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472,
Elsevier.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2004. "Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 4458, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson, 2004. "Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," NBER Working Papers 10481, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson, 2004. "Institutions As The Fundamental Cause Of Long-Run Growth," Documentos CEDE 2889, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
- Bernard Baudry & Virgile Chassagnon, 2012.
"The vertical network organization as a specific governance structure: what are the challenges for incomplete contracts theories and what are the theoretical implications for the boundaries of the (hub,"
Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(2), pages 285-303, May.
- Bernard Baudry & Virgile Chassagnon, 2012. "The vertical network organization as a specific governance structure : what are the challenges for incomplete contracts theories and what are the theoretical implications for the boundaries of the (hu," Post-Print halshs-00683231, HAL.
- Stein, Jeremy C., 2003.
"Agency, information and corporate investment,"
Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 111-165,
Elsevier.
- Jeremy C. Stein, 2001. "Agency, Information and Corporate Investment," NBER Working Papers 8342, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Albanese, Marina & Navarra, Cecilia & Tortia, Ermanno C., 2015.
"Employer moral hazard and wage rigidity. The case of worker owned and investor owned firms,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 227-237.
- Marina Albanese & Cecilia Navarra & Ermanno Tortia, 2013. "Employer moral hazard and wage rigidity. The case of worker-owned and investor-owned firms," DEM Discussion Papers 2013/02, Department of Economics and Management.
- Ermanno Celeste Tortia, 2013. "Employer moral hazard and wage rigidity. The case of worker-owned and investor-owned firms," Econometica Working Papers wp46, Econometica.
- Jain, Sanjay & Majumdar, Sumon, 2016. "State capacity, redistributive compensation and the political economy of economic policy reform," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 462-473.
- Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Dessein, Wouter, 2012. "Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9019, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
- Eric Van den Steen, 2010. "Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 466-490, March.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021.
"On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," MPRA Paper 106947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers 15970, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
- David C. Chan, 2018. "The Efficiency of Slacking off: Evidence From the Emergency Department," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(3), pages 997-1030, May.
- Do, Quy-Toan & Levchenko, Andrei A., 2009.
"Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1489-1520, July.
- Mr. Andrei A Levchenko & Quý Toàn Ðo, 2006. "Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions," IMF Working Papers 2006/056, International Monetary Fund.
- Do, Quy-Toan & Levchenko, Andrei A., 2006. "Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3836, The World Bank.
- Uwe Walz & Carsten Bienz, 2006.
"Evolution of Decision and Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts: An Empirical Analysis,"
FMG Discussion Papers
dp585, Financial Markets Group.
- Bienz, Carsten & Walz, Uwe, 2007. "Evolution of Decision and Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," Discussion Papers 2007/13, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
- Bienz, Carsten & Walz, Uwe, 2006. "Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24637, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
- Roman Inderst & Holger M. Mueller & Felix Münnich, 2006.
"Financing a Portfolio of Projects,"
The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(4), pages 1289-1325.
- Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger & Muennich, Felix, 2006. "Financing a Portfolio of Projects," CEPR Discussion Papers 5711, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M. & Münnich, Felix, 2006. "Financing a portfolio of projects," IMFS Working Paper Series 5, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
- Inderst, Roman & Müller, Holger & Münnich, Felix, 2009. "Financing a portfolio of projects," IMFS Working Paper Series 34, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
More about this item
Keywords
Resistance to Change; Leadership; Adaptation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2010-05-22 (Business Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.48. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alberto Prina Cerai The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Alberto Prina Cerai to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feemmit.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.