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Collective (In)Action and Corruption: Access to Improved Water and Sanitation

Author

Listed:
  • Nejat Anbarci

    (Department of Economics, Florida International University)

  • Monica Escaleras

    () (Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University)

  • Charles Register

    (Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University)

Abstract

A country’s levels of collective action in the provision of socially desirable goods and services are primarily determined by its level of development, important natural attributes, and its unique institutional characteristics. In general, one can expect that, given a particular set of natural attributes and institutions, the greater a county’s per capita GDP, the more extensive will be its commitment to the provision of goods and services that require collective action. The primary contention of this paper is that one of the most important aspects of institutions that affect socially desirable collective action is the extent of public sector corruption. More specifically, we first develop a theoretical model which explicitly shows the relations between per capita GDP, corruption, and collective action in the form of the provision of improved drinking water and appropriate sanitation facilities. We test our model by analyzing a sample of 77 countries, annually, between 1982 and 2001, for a total sample of 1,519 observations. Relying on a two-way fixed effects estimation strategy, we find that corruption does in fact lead to lower levels of both access to improved drinking water and appropriate sanitation than a given country’s level of per capita GDP and other institutions alone would predict.

Suggested Citation

  • Nejat Anbarci & Monica Escaleras & Charles Register, 2006. "Collective (In)Action and Corruption: Access to Improved Water and Sanitation," Working Papers 06003, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
  • Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:06003
    as

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    File URL: http://home.fau.edu/mescaler/web/working%20papers/sanitation.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Friedman, 1999. "Why Not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages 259-269, December.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1126-1137, September.
    3. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
    4. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collective Action; corruption; institutional variables;

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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