IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/euirsc/p0076.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Tax Competition and Tax Co-operation in the EU: The Case of Savings Taxation

Author

Listed:
  • Katharina Holzinger

Abstract

It took the EU 35 years to achieve a co-operative agreement on co-ordinated measures of savings taxation in a world with mobile capital. Political science has offered two explanations for this co-operation problem. First, co-operation is difficult as a result of the heterogeneity of governments' interests. Countries with a small domestic tax base favour tax competition, while countries with a large tax base prefer tax co-operation. Second, co-operation is difficult as a consequence of specific characteristics of the collective action problem involved. The actors face a prisoners' dilemma. Both explanations have their limits. The first approach is not very good in predicting actual policy preferences of governments, and the second approach dismisses the fact that the EU offers co-operative institutions that should be able to resolve a dilemma. The paper proposes a model which refines these explanations and fits better the positions of EU governments and their problems of finding an agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Katharina Holzinger, 2003. "Tax Competition and Tax Co-operation in the EU: The Case of Savings Taxation," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 7, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
  • Handle: RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0076
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.eui.eu/ERPA/RSCAS/../../RSCAS/WP-Texts/03_07.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.eui.eu/ERPA/RSCAS/../../RSCAS/WP-Texts/03_07.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
    2. Myles, Gareth D., 2000. "Wasteful government, tax evasion, and the provision of public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 51-74, March.
    3. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1997. "The selection principle and market failure in systems competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 247-274, November.
    4. Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November.
    5. Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith & Alexander Klemm, 2002. "Corporate income tax reforms and international tax competition," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 449-495, October.
    6. Dehejia, Vivek H. & Genschel, Philipp, 1998. "Tax competition in the European Union," MPIfG Discussion Paper 98/3, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    7. Fuest, Clemens, 2000. "The Political Economy of Tax Coordination as a Bargaining Game between Bureaucrats and Politicians," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 357-382, June.
    8. Michael Keen, 1993. "The welfare economics of tax co-ordination in the European Community : a survey," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 14(2), pages 15-36, February.
    9. Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Oeffner, Marc, 2005. "Die Duale Einkommensteuer des Sachverständigenrates in der Diskussion," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 59, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.
    2. McCahery, J.A. & Vermeulen, E.P.M., 2004. "The changing landscape of EU company law," Discussion Paper 2004-023, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    3. Lukas Hakelberg, 2014. "The Power Politics of International Tax Cooperation. Why Luxembourg and Austria accepted automatic exchange of information on foreign account holders’ interest income," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers p0375, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; regulatory competition; tax policy; harmonisation; policy coordination; positive integration; financial markets; directives;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0076. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Valerio PAPPALARDO). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/rsiueit.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.