Introducing Competition in the French Electricity Supply Industry: the destabilisation of a public hierarchy in an open institutional environment
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Other versions of this item:
- Finon, D., 2003. "Introducing Competition in the French Electricity Supply Industry: The Destabilisation of a Public Hierarchy in an Open Institutional Environment," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0314, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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Cited by:
- Jacques Pelkmans & Lionel Kapff, 2010. "Interconnector Investment for a Well-functioning Internal Market. What EU regime of regulatory incentives?," Bruges European Economic Research Papers 18, European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe.
- Eva Niesten, 2006. "Regulatory Institutions And Governance Transformations In Liberalising Electricity Industries," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(3), pages 291-307, September.
- Haas, R. & Auer, H., 2006. "The prerequisites for effective competition in restructured wholesale electricity markets," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 857-864.
- Adrien de Hauteclocque & Yannick Perez, 2011. "Law & Economics Perspectives on Electricity Regulation," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/21, European University Institute.
- Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon, 2005.
"A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned Incumbent: The Case of France,"
The Energy Journal, , vol. 26(1_suppl), pages 181-204, June.
- Jean-Michel Glachant and Dominique Finon, 2005. "A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned Incumbent: The Case of France," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I), pages 181-204.
- J.-M. Glachant & D. Finon, 2005. "A competitive fringe in the shadow of a state owned incumbent: The case of France," Post-Print hal-00716730, HAL.
- Glachant, J-M. & Finon, D., 2005. "A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned Incumbent: The Case of France," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0524, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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Keywords
; ;JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
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