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A noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing rules

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  • Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier
  • Iñarra García, María Elena
  • Luquin, Paloma

Abstract

This paper provides a noncooperative understanding of the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation for airport cost problems. We find that every Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game has the nucleolus as outcome while the egalitarian allocation is just one of the Nash outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier & Iñarra García, María Elena & Luquin, Paloma, 2006. "A noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing rules," IKERLANAK 2006-23, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehu:ikerla:6372
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    File URL: https://addi.ehu.es/handle/10810/6372
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 1997. "A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 55-72, January.
    2. Potters, Jos & Sudholter, Peter, 1999. "Airport problems and consistent allocation rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 83-102, July.
    3. Javier Arin & Elena Inarra, 2001. "Egalitarian solutions in the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 187-193.
    4. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    airport games; egalitarian allocation; nucleolus; Nash outcomes;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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