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Optimal Monetary Policy with Asymmetric Preferences for Output

  • Scott, Patrick
  • Cassou, Steven P.
  • Vázquez Pérez, Jesús

Using a model of an optimizing monetary authority which has preferences that weigh inflation and unemployment, Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) finds empirical evidence that the authority has asymmetric preferences for unemployment. We extend this model to weigh inflation and output and show that the empirical evidence using these series also supports an asymmetric preference hypothesis, only in our case, preferences are asymmetric for output. We also find evidence that the monetary authority targets potential output rather than some higher output level as would be the case in an extended Barro and Gordon (1983) model.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10810/9096
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Paper provided by University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II in its series DFAEII Working Papers with number 2012-16.

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Date of creation: 15 Nov 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:9096
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Order Information: Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, = Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
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  1. Cukierman, Alex, 2001. "Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent about Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does it Make?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,05, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  2. Carl Walsh, 2003. "Speed Limit Policies: The Output Gap and Optimal Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 265-278, March.
  3. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  4. Surico, Paolo, 2007. "The Fed's monetary policy rule and U.S. inflation: The case of asymmetric preferences," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 305-324, January.
  5. Ireland, Peter N., 1999. "Does the time-consistency problem explain the behavior of inflation in the United States?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 279-291, October.
  6. RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2001. "The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets, the Natural Rate of Unemployment," Cahiers de recherche 2001-22, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  7. Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J., 2003. "Does the Barro-Gordon model explain the behavior of US inflation? A reexamination of the empirical evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1375-1390, September.
  8. Lucas, Robert E., 1977. "Understanding business cycles," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 7-29, January.
  9. A. Robert Nobay & David A. Peel, 2003. "Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy in a Model of Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 657-665, 07.
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