Optimal monetary policy with asymmetric preferences for output
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- Cassou, Steven P. & Scott, Patrick & Vázquez Pérez, Jesús, 2012. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Asymmetric Preferences for Output," DFAEII Working Papers 2012-16, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Chesang, Laban K. & Naraidoo, Ruthira, 2016.
"Parameter uncertainty and inflation dynamics in a model with asymmetric central bank preferences,"
Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-10.
- Laban K. Chesang & Ruthira Naraidoo, 2014. "Parameter Uncertainty and Inflation Dynamics in a Model with Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences," Working Papers 201437, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
- C. Patrick Scott, 2016. "Are central bank preferences asymmetric when policy targets vary over time?," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 577-589, September.
- Scott, C. Patrick, 2016. "Asymmetric preferences and monetary policy deviations," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 325-334.
More about this item
KeywordsOptimal monetary policy; Asymmetric preferences; Conditional output volatility;
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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