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Free or fair elections? The introduction of electronic voting in Brazil

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  • Schneider, Rodrigo

Abstract

This paper studies the phased-in introduction of electronic voting in Brazil to disentangle the effects of free and fair elections on politicians’ responsiveness to voters’ demands. The new technology improved voters’ access, particularly for less educated ones, to legislative elections, and it undercut the election fraud that had previously occurred with paper ballots during the vote count (that is, votes were added to tabulation sheets after voting had ended). At the same time, the new technology increased the relative appeal of voter fraud via ballot stuffing (that is, when voters illegally vote more than once). I find that municipalities using electronic rather than paper ballots experienced larger increases in the number of registered voters, suggesting an increase in ballot stuffing. I also find that enfranchisement biased toward low-income voters does not necessarily lead to an increase in public spending. Results suggest that election fairness is a complementary condition to guarantee electoral accountability.

Suggested Citation

  • Schneider, Rodrigo, 2020. "Free or fair elections? The introduction of electronic voting in Brazil," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 123146, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:123146
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    File URL: https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/123146/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rodrigo Schneider & Diloá Athias & Mauricio Bugarin, 2019. "Does enfranchisement affect fiscal policy? Theory and empirical evidence on Brazil," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 389-412, December.
    2. Daniel Gingerich, 2013. "Can Institutions Cure Clientelism? Assessing the Impact of the Australian Ballot in Brazil," Research Department Publications IDB-WP-428, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
    4. Kelly Shue & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2009. "Who Misvotes? The Effect of Differential Cognition Costs on Election Outcomes," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 229-257, February.
    5. David Card & Enrico Moretti, 2007. "Does Voting Technology Affect Election Outcomes? Touch-screen Voting and the 2004 Presidential Election," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(4), pages 660-673, November.
    6. Peter Lindert, 2004. "Social Spending and Economic Growth," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(4), pages 6-16.
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    Cited by:

    1. Diloá Athias & Rodrigo Schneider, 2021. "The impact of political representation on the provision of public goods and services," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(2), pages 367-381, June.
    2. Nishijima, Marislei & Pal, Sarmistha, 2026. "Green Mandates and the Politics in the Jungle: Do Leftist Mayors Curb Amazon Deforestation?," IZA Discussion Papers 18659, IZA Network @ LISER.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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