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Close relationships between banks and firms: is it good or bad?

Author

Listed:
  • Cerasi, Vittoria
  • Daltung, Sonja

Abstract

This paper investigates the issues involved in cross-ownership between banks and firms. The idea is that congruity among the parties in control of the bank and the firm allows to save on monitoring costs, but it gives rise to a conflict of interest between on one hand the parties in control of the bank and on the other hand the outside investors, as for example depositors, of the bank. Nevertheless, the paper shows that there are benefits from cross-ownership, whenever the bank involved in the relationship is debt financed and well diversified.

Suggested Citation

  • Cerasi, Vittoria & Daltung, Sonja, 1998. "Close relationships between banks and firms: is it good or bad?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119145, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:119145
    as

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    File URL: https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119145/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Saunders, Anthony, 1994. "Banking and commerce: An overview of the public policy issues," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 231-254, January.
    2. Kroszner, Randall S & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking before 1933," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 810-832, September.
    3. Saunders, Anthony & Walter, Ingo, 1994. "Universal Banking in the United States: What Could We Gain? What Could We Lose?," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195080698.
    4. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1990. "Bank Monitoring and Investment: Evidence from the Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking Relationships," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 105-126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Gorton, Gary & Schmid, Frank A., 2000. "Universal banking and the performance of German firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 29-80.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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