IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/111551.html

Persuasion with correlation neglect: a full manipulation result

Author

Listed:
  • Levy, Gilat
  • Moreno de Barreda, Inés
  • Razin, Ronny

Abstract

We consider an information design problem in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver that has "correlation neglect", i.e. fails to understand that signals might be correlated. We show that a sender with unlimited number of signals can fully manipulate the receiver. Specifically, the sender can induce the receiver to hold any state-dependent posterior she wishes to. If the sender only wishes to induce a state-independent posterior, she can use fully correlated signals, but generally she needs to design more involved correlation structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Levy, Gilat & Moreno de Barreda, Inés & Razin, Ronny, 2022. "Persuasion with correlation neglect: a full manipulation result," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 111551, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:111551
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/111551/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, December.
    2. Robert F. Bordley, 1982. "A Multiplicative Formula for Aggregating Probability Assessments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(10), pages 1137-1148, October.
    3. Andrew Ellis & Michele Piccione, 2017. "Correlation Misperception in Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(4), pages 1264-1292, April.
    4. Benjamin Golub & Matthew O. Jackson, 2012. "How Homophily Affects the Speed of Learning and Best-Response Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(3), pages 1287-1338.
    5. Ido Kallir & Doron Sonsino, 2009. "The Neglect of Correlation in Allocation Decisions," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 1045-1066, April.
    6. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Omer Tamuz, 2020. "Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs," Papers 2002.11362, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
    7. Benjamin Enke & Florian Zimmermann, 2019. "Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 313-332.
    8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yaron Azrieli & Rachana Das, 2025. "Sequential Non-Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2508.09464, arXiv.org.
    2. Ran Spiegler, 2023. "Behavioral Causal Inference," Papers 2305.18916, arXiv.org.
    3. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2023. "Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions," Papers 2307.07672, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    4. Andrew T Little, 2023. "Bayesian explanations for persuasion," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(3), pages 147-181, July.
    5. Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2024. "News Media as Suppliers of Narratives (and Information)," Papers 2403.09155, arXiv.org.
    6. Ellis, Andrew, 2025. "Correlation concern," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    7. Florian Mudekereza, 2025. "Aggregate Efficiency in Games," Papers 2501.13019, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
    8. Maxim Senkov & Toygar T. Kerman, 2024. "Changing Simplistic Worldviews," Papers 2401.02867, arXiv.org.
    9. Anderson, Axel & Pkhakadze, Nikoloz, 2025. "Polarizing persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 181-198.
    10. Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Nachbar, John, 2025. "Robust personal equilibrium effects in misspecified causal models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Inés Moreno de Barreda & Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2017. "Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: Media Power via Correlation of News Content," Economics Series Working Papers 836, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Hossain, Tanjim & Okui, Ryo, 2024. "Belief formation under signal correlation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 160-183.
    3. Andreas Haupt & Zoe Hitzig, 2023. "Opaque Contracts," Papers 2301.13404, arXiv.org.
    4. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2018. "Information diffusion in networks with the Bayesian Peer Influence heuristic," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 262-270.
    5. Maxim Senkov & Toygar T. Kerman, 2024. "Changing Simplistic Worldviews," Papers 2401.02867, arXiv.org.
    6. Mu Zhang, 2021. "A Theory of Choice Bracketing under Risk," Papers 2102.07286, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
    7. Larry Samuelson & Jakub Steiner, 2024. "Robust latent data representations," ECON - Working Papers 460, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2025.
    8. Perez-Richet, Eduardo & Vigier, Adrien & Bizzotto, Jacopo, 2019. "Information Design with Agency," CEPR Discussion Papers 13868, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Zhou, Jing, 2024. "Does correlation matter in probability matching? A laboratory investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 876-894.
    10. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2021. "A maximum likelihood approach to combining forecasts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 104116, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Aislinn Bohren & Daniel Hauser, 2017. "Bounded Rationality And Learning: A Framwork and A Robustness Result," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 May 2017.
    12. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Atulya Jain & Rann Smorodinsky, 2025. "Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information," Papers 2510.12508, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.
    13. Grant, Simon & Stauber, Ronald, 2022. "Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 487-509.
    14. Pinger, Pia & Schäfer, Sebastian & Schumacher, Heiner, 2018. "Locus of control and consistent investment choices," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 66-75.
    15. Piotr Dworczak & Alessandro Pavan, 2022. "Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2017-2051, September.
    16. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2019. "Echo chambers and their effects on economic and political outcomes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 101413, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019. "Why Echo Chambers are Useful," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203517, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    18. Wang, Han, 2025. "Contracting with heterogeneous researchers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 278-294.
    19. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2018. "Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2128R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2021.
    20. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2022. "Combining forecasts in the presence of ambiguity over correlation structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:111551. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.